Danial Latifi v Union of India
Rule established
The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 is constitutionally valid but is read down. The obligation of a Muslim husband under S.3(1)(a) is not confined to the iddat period. Reasonable and fair provision and maintenance are distinct: the husband must, within the iddat period, make and pay a reasonable and fair provision for his divorced wife extending beyond the iddat period, in addition to maintenance for the iddat period itself. If she is unable to maintain herself after iddat and has not remarried, recourse lies against her relatives under S.4 and failing them against the State Wakf Board.
Facts
- A writ petition, filed by counsel who had appeared for Shah Bano, challenging the constitutional validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986. The Act had been enacted in the aftermath of Shah Bano, in which the Supreme Court had held that a divorced Muslim woman unable to maintain herself was entitled to maintenance under S.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure beyond the iddat period. On the petitioners' reading of the 1986 Act, it confined her entitlement to the iddat period, and they contended that this violated Arts.14, 15 and 21.
Issue
- Whether the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 is unconstitutional, and whether the husband's obligation under S.3(1)(a) is confined to the iddat period.
Held
- The Act was upheld but read down. The obligation under S.3(1)(a) is not confined to iddat. The two expressions in the provision are distinct: the husband must, within the iddat period, make and pay a reasonable and fair provision for his divorced wife extending beyond the iddat period, in addition to maintenance for the iddat period itself. Where she is unable to maintain herself after iddat and has not remarried, S.4 provides recourse against her relatives who would inherit her property, and failing them against the State Wakf Board. So construed, the Act does not offend Arts.14, 15 or 21.
Ratio Decidendi
The whole decision turns on a distinction of language that the drafters may or may not have intended. S.3(1)(a) speaks of "a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period". Two readings were available. The narrow reading, pressed against the Act, treats "within the iddat period" as limiting the substance of the entitlement, so that the husband owes only what is needed for those three months. The reading the Court adopted treats "within the iddat period" as limiting the time for performance, not the extent of the obligation. The husband must act within iddat, but what he must provide is a provision adequate for the wife's future, which by its nature extends beyond iddat. "Provision" and "maintenance" are then t
How to use it in an exam
- Essential in every question on maintenance of a divorced Muslim woman. The formula to remember is: provision, made within iddat but extending beyond it; maintenance, for iddat.
- The precise ratio is the distinction between "provision" and "maintenance". Answers that say only that the Act was "read down to extend maintenance beyond iddat" miss the mechanism.
- Set out the S.4 cascade: after iddat, if she cannot maintain herself and has not remarried, liability falls on relatives who would inherit her property in proportion to their shares, and failing them on the State Wakf Board.
- Read as the middle term of a three case sequence:
- - Mohd Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum (1985): S.125 CrPC applies to a divorced Muslim woman beyond iddat.
- - Danial Latifi (2001): the 1986 Act, which was passed to undo that, is upheld but read down to the same practical effect.
- - Mohd Abdul Samad v State of Telangana (2024): the 1986 Act does not oust S.125 CrPC, now S.144 BNSS, at all; the remedies are cumulative.
- Note the constitutional technique: reading down to save a statute. Useful in Constitutional Law answers on severability and reading down as well.
Source
Source: (2001) 7 SCC 740; AIR 2001 SC 3958; 2001 Cri LJ 4660. Writ Petition (Civil) No 868 of 1986. Five Judge Constitution Bench, judgment authored by S Rajendra Babu J and delivered 28 September 2001. Bench, authorship, date and holding verified on audit of 12 August 2026.
This is an educational summary, not the judgment itself. Cite the reported version in professional or academic work.