Dr M Ismail Faruqui v Union of India
Rule established
S.4(3) of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act 1993, which abated all pending suits relating to the disputed area, is unconstitutional and invalid because abating suits without providing an alternative dispute resolution mechanism extinguishes the judicial remedy and negates the rule of law; the provision is severable and the rest of the Act is valid. Irrespective of the status of a mosque under Muslim law in Islamic countries, the status of a mosque under the Mahomedan law applicable in secular India is the same and equal to that of any other place of worship of any religion, and it does not enjoy any greater immunity from acquisition under the sovereign power of the State.
Facts
- The constitutional validity of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act 1993 (Act 33 of 1993), and the maintainability of Special Reference No 1 of 1993 made the same day by the President under Art.143(1).
- The Act acquired about 67.7 acres, including the 2.77 acre disputed site on which the Babri Masjid had stood until 6 December 1992, and S.4(3) abated all pending suits and legal proceedings relating to the disputed area. The structure had not been used as a mosque since December 1949, when idols were placed in it and the premises were attached under S.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Issue
- Whether the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act 1993 was constitutionally valid, in particular S.4(3) abating pending suits; whether a mosque enjoys immunity from acquisition under Arts.25 and 26; and whether the Art.143(1) Reference was maintainable.
Held
- By a majority of three to two, and from the numbered conclusions at paragraph 98:
- (1)(a) S.4(3) is unconstitutional and invalid. Abating all pending suits without providing an alternative dispute resolution mechanism extinguishes the judicial remedy and negates the rule of law; the Art.143(1) Reference was not an effective substitute, since the core question in the suits was not covered by it. (1)(b) S.4(3) is severable and the rest of the Act is valid.
- (2) Irrespective of the status of a mosque under Muslim law in Islamic countries, the status of a mosque under the Mahomedan law applicable in secular India is the same and equal to that of any other place of worship of any religion, and it does not enjoy any greater immunity from acquisition under the sovereign or prerogative power of the State.
- (3) The pending suits stand revived.
- (4) The vesting under S.3 is limited, the Central Government holding the disputed area as a statutory receiver bound to hand it over to the party found entitled on final adjudication.
Ratio Decidendi
On S.4(3) and the rule of law. Acquisition of property is a legitimate exercise of sovereign power, and the Court did not question it. What it would not accept was the extinction of the pending litigation. A statute which acquires disputed property and simultaneously abolishes the proceedings in which the dispute would have been resolved leaves the parties with a grievance and no forum, which is a denial of the judicial remedy itself. The Art.143(1) Reference could not fill that gap because it did not cover the core question in the suits. Severing S.4(3) preserved the acquisition while restoring the forum, and the characterisation of the Government as a statutory receiver completed the solution: the property is held, not appropriated, pending adjudication. **On the immunity of
How to use it in an exam
- The authority on acquisition of waqf property. The proposition to state is that waqf property, including a mosque, enjoys no greater immunity from acquisition than any other place of worship, and that Art.25 contains no reference to property while Art.26 does not curtail the power of acquisition.
- Cite for the rule of law holding on S.4(3): a statute cannot abate pending litigation without providing an alternative mechanism, since that extinguishes the judicial remedy. Useful in Constitutional Law answers on the rule of law, on severability, and on legislative interference with the judicial function.
- Cite for the concept of the Government as statutory receiver, a limited vesting pending adjudication.
- State the "essential part" observation carefully, in the form set out in the warning above, and note the confinement in M Siddiq (2018) and Nazeer J's dissent. This is the single most important point of precision in the case.
- *Contrast with Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v State of Bombay* (All India Reporter 1962 Supreme Court 853). The two cases mark the boundary of Art.26 protection: internal religious governance, such as the power of excommunication, is strongly protected, whereas property** is not immune from the sovereign power of acquisition. Making that contrast is a strong way to open or close an essay on Arts.25 and 26 in the waqf context.
- Note the date discrepancy: decided 24 October 1994, but the AIR report is AIR 1995 SC 605(A).
Source
Source: (1994) 6 SCC 360; AIR 1995 SC 605(A); 1994 AIR SCW 4883 and 4897; JT 1994 (6) 632. Five Judge Constitution Bench, heard with Mohd Aslam and connected matters and with Special Reference No 1 of 1993 under Art.143(1). Judgment of 24 October 1994; note the AIR report year is 1995. Bench, the three to two division, date and holdings verified on audit of 12 August 2026. The 'not an essential part of the practice of Islam' observation appears at paragraph 85 in the section headed 'Mosque: Immunity From Acquisition', and was later expressly confined to the acquisition context by a three Judge Bench in M Siddiq v Mahant Suresh Das (2018) by two to one, S Abdul Nazeer J dissenting.
This is an educational summary, not the judgment itself. Cite the reported version in professional or academic work.