Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v State of Bombay
Rule established
On the faith and tenets of the Dawoodi Bohras, the exercise of the power of excommunication by the religious head on religious grounds forms part of the management of the community's affairs in matters of religion, so a statute invalidating even such excommunication infringes Art.26(b). Arts.25 and 26 protect not merely doctrines and beliefs but acts done in pursuance of religion, and what is an essential part of a religion is judged in the light of its doctrine and of what the community itself regards as part of its religion. The Art.26(b) right is not subject to the preservation of civil rights.
Facts
- S.3 of the Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act 1949 provided that notwithstanding any law, custom or usage, no excommunication of a member of any community should be valid or of any effect. The statutory definition of "community" in S.2 expressly included the Dawoodi Bohras.
- The petitioner was the 51st Dai ul Mutlaq, the religious head of the Dawoodi Bohra community and trustee of its property. He challenged the Act as violating Arts.25 and 26, relying on the Privy Council decision in Hasan Ali v Mansoor Ali (1947) Law Reports 75 Indian Appeals 1, to which he had himself been a party, as recognising his right to excommunicate members within prescribed limits.
Issue
- Whether a statute invalidating excommunication infringes the right of a religious denomination to manage its own affairs in matters of religion under Art.26(b), and the right to freedom of religion under Art.25.
Held
- By four to one, Sinha CJ dissenting, the Act violated Arts.25 and 26 and was void.
- On the religious faith and tenets of the Dawoodi Bohras, the exercise of the power of excommunication by the religious head on religious grounds forms part of the management of the community's affairs in matters of religion, and by invalidating even such excommunication the Act infringed the right under Art.26(b).
- Arts.25 and 26 protect not merely doctrines and beliefs but acts done in pursuance of religion, including rituals, observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are integral parts of religion. What is an essential part of a religion is to be judged in the light of the doctrine of that religion and of what the community itself regards as part of its religion.
- The Court followed the Shirur Mutt line: Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar [1954] Supreme Court Reports 1005, Mahant Jagannath Ramanuj Das v State of Orissa [1954] Supreme Court Reports 1046, Sri Venkataramana Devaru v State of Mysore [1958] Supreme Court Reports 895, and Durgah Committee, Ajmer v Syed Hussain Ali [1962] 1 Supreme Court Reports 383.
- The Art.26(b) right is not subject to the preservation of civil rights; its only limitations are those in the Article itself, namely public order, morality and health, and those in Art.25(2).
Ratio Decidendi
The reasoning turns on a distinction between the religious and the civil aspects of excommunication. Excommunication has civil consequences: the excommunicated person may be excluded from communal property, from burial grounds, from mosques. The State may legitimately regulate those consequences. But the act of excommunication itself, exercised by the religious head on religious grounds, is an exercise of the denomination's authority over its own membership, and membership is the most basic question of religious governance there is. A statute which declares such an act to be of no effect whatever does not regulate the civil consequences; it removes the denomination's power to determine who belongs to it. The essential practices test is applied in a form favourable to t
How to use it in an exam
- Cite for the proposition that the Dawoodi Bohras, and by extension the Shia sub schools, are recognised as distinct religious denominations entitled to the protection of Art.26. This is the constitutional counterpart of the point in Unit 1 that the schools are internally valid and differ genuinely.
- Cite for the essential practices formulation: what is essential is judged in the light of the religion's doctrine and of what the community itself regards as part of its religion.
- Cite for the proposition that Art.26(b) is not subject to the preservation of civil rights, and that its only limits are public order, morality and health, and Art.25(2).
- State the split. It was four to one, with Sinha CJ dissenting, and giving that detail distinguishes a careful answer.
- Contrast with Md Ismail Faruqui v Union of India (1994) 6 Supreme Court Cases 360, where the Court held that a mosque enjoys no greater immunity from acquisition than any other place of worship. The two cases mark the boundary: internal religious governance is strongly protected, but property is not.
- Useful in Constitutional Law answers on Arts.25 and 26, on the essential religious practices doctrine, and on the relationship between religious freedom and social reform legislation.
- > [!warning] Currency: the decision has been referred for reconsideration
Source
Source: AIR 1962 SC 853; (1962) Supp (2) SCR 496. Five Judge Constitution Bench, judgment of 9 January 1962, decided four to one with Sinha CJ dissenting. There is an earlier reported interlocutory decision between the same parties at [1958] SCR 1007 on what constitutes a final order; the two should not be confused. Bench, split, date and holding verified on audit of 12 August 2026. CURRENCY CAVEAT: the correctness of this decision was doubted and referred to a larger Bench in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v State of Maharashtra (2005) 2 SCC 673, and that reference was later tagged with the questions framed in the Sabarimala review before a nine Judge Bench; whether the reference has since been decided could not be established.
This is an educational summary, not the judgment itself. Cite the reported version in professional or academic work.